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PRESENTATION BY COUNCILMEMBER
KATHY PATTERSON*
November 21, 2003
As is often the case with complicated issues, I come to the David A. Clark
School of Law Symposium today with more questions than answers. But I
thought it might be instructive for others to see the issue of civil liberties from the
perspective of a legislator. I see five issues that I would pose as questions pertinent to the discussion today and also front-burner issues for the District of Columbia Council's Committee on the Judiciary, which I chair.
First, when does use of closed-circuit television technology cease to protect the
public safety and intrude on rights to privacy? Second, where should the line be
drawn between police actions that are protective and police actions that are preemptive? A third issue: is it ever justified for police to act against individuals
based on the content of their speech? The final two questions emerge from the
other three: what is the capacity of the police department in the nation's capital
to effectively police itself against unwarranted violations of civil liberties? And
finally: who makes these decisions; who answers these questions? What is operational and what is policy? What is a policy I can appropriately articulate as a
District of Columbia legislator versus what should be undertaken as a matter of
national policy by my counterparts at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue?
All of these issues are in play at the moment in a Judiciary Committee investigation of the policies and practices of the Metropolitan Police Department in
handling demonstrations. That investigation arose from the April 2000 antiglobalization protests and the arrests made during a weekend of antiwar and antiglobalization demonstrations in September 2002. We scheduled two days of public hearings in mid-December, and anticipate issuing a report with findings and
recommendations early in calendar 2004.
Many of you are aware of legislation pending before the Council to govern the
use of closed circuit television by the Metropolitan Police Department, and the
ACLU's local leadership has very usefully presented the Committee with an alternative draft bill for our consideration. For those less familiar, the District's
police force built what is now called the Joint Operations Command Center at
police headquarters consisting of a huge bank of television screens displaying,
when operational, scenes captured by fourteen video cameras mounted atop
buildings throughout the downtown area. The center is operational-the cameras
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are turned on-whenever there is a major event in the city. It was last operational on the weekend of October 24-25, 2003, during anti-war demonstrations.
The legislation, like the governing regulations that were already approved by
the D.C. Council, require public notification whenever the department's CCTV
system goes live. The notice posted to the web on October 20 includes this explanation routinely included in MPD press releases:
The Metropolitan Police Department's CCTV system is a secure, wireless
network of 14 cameras owned and operated by the MPD. These cameras
are mounted on various buildings primarily in the downtown DC area. They
focus on public spaces around the National Mall, the US Capitol, the White
House, Union Station and other critical installations, as well as major arteries and highways that pass through downtown DC. Under DC regulations,
additional cameras can be added to the network on a temporary or permanent basis following a period of public comment. During exigent circumstances, additional cameras can be deployed on a temporary basis without

advance public notice, but with a post-deployment notification to the
public.
The CCTV system is not a round-the-clock video monitoring operation. The
system is activated only during major events in the District (such as largescale demonstrations, the Fourth of July celebration, Presidential Inaugurations, etc.) or during periods of heightened alert for terrorism. CCTV camera feeds are displayed in the MPD's Joint Operations Command Center
(JOCC), a secure facility located on the 5th Floor of police headquarters.
The JOCC is operated by the MPD, but may include staff from other federal, regional, state and local public safety agencies participating in joint
operations.
The MPD's use of CCTV is designed to ensure the protection of personal
privacy rights. The CCTV network has no audio capability; it provides video
images of public spaces only. The cameras can pan at 360 degrees and tilt at

180 degrees. The cameras do have the capability to zoom in on a particular
location, but are used primarily to monitor wide areas of public space, not
the individuals within that space. The CCTV system does not use face-recognition or any other biometric technology. Both DC regulations and internal MPD policy expressly prohibit the arbitrary monitoring of individuals or
monitoring of individuals based on race, gender or other factors. Regulations and policies also prohibit the use of the CCTV system for the purpose
of infringing on First Amendment rights.
The Joint Operation Command Center was created, the cameras bought and
installed, without a review of these actions by the Council. Police leaders have
testified that they considered this center and its capacity to have been appropriate, forward-looking operational responses to security needs and the availability
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of technology-an example of protection and not preemption. Planning for the
center began in the wake of the anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Washington, in 1999. The closed circuit system was first used on September 11, 2001.
I believe it would be irresponsible for me or any other policymaker to fail to
use technology that can help keep people safe. I am not troubled by the existence
of the technology and the Joint Operations Command Center. I have a number of
questions about the use of the technology-when and with what level of notice.
The legislation, like regulations already in place, requires notification and reporting on the use of the technology. And the legislation prohibits any further deployment of additional, more intrusive technologies without explicit Council
approval.
I believe the surveillance capability offers a useful, and justified, means of
monitoring and responding to a major incident. If someone set off explosives at
the Wilson Building, the Metropolitan Police Department would have, among
other tools, a television picture of the building and its surroundings and that
could aid in securing the scene. Here is a real world question we will ask at the
hearings in December. Last September nearly 400 persons were arrested in Pershing Park between the White House and the Wilson Building-and were arrested illegally. I want to know what the command staff at the Joint Operations
Command Center saw that day and whether they, with a bird's eye view of the
park through the surveillance cameras, concurred with the commander's frontline
assessment that this crowd was dangerous and needed locking up.
Our investigation is basically second-guessing police department decisions
made that day. Another question: what second guessing did the department itself
undertake that day? Did the surveillance cameras capture what news tapes appear to have captured: that the crowd was calm and peaceful?
In the months and, now, years, since September 11, 2001, the issue of protection versus privacy has taken on an urgency. When it comes to the views of the
American public, the lines may well have shifted in the direction of security and
away from the protections of personal privacy. That is surely the case with regard
to federal law and regulation. Those I represent, residents of the nation's capital,
expect policymakers to take any and every action possible to provide protection
from harm; protection from potential terror. Part of my job is to anticipate where
and how public policy can support and promote personal safety.
Another issue we are exploring in the Judiciary investigation, the second issue
I noted at the outset, has to do with whether actions are preemptive; whether a
police action is undertaken expressly to frustrate an individual's right to free expression. This issue arose in April 2000 when the police department and the Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services closed down the building used
as a "convergence center"-an office and meeting place used by the anti-globalization groups. The city's fire marshall inspected the building and cited the occupants for a series of building code and fire code violations. We are examining this
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issue based on allegations that the action was "pretextual," that is, though some
violations were discovered, the inspection itself was designed to thwart legitimate
protest activity. In the three years since the first globalization protests here in the
District, law enforcement agencies have taken other actions that appear preemptive, including cordoning off large sections of downtown and removing newspaper boxes. The justification: protecting against newsstands being hurled through
store windows. The arrests in September 2002 in Pershing Park, similarly, are
alleged to have been preemptive, designed to remove from the streets individuals
who would likely have participated in demonstrations over the following days.
There is an extent to which preemptive actions are precluded by Constitutional protections and this issue is part of ongoing lawsuits in U.S. District Court
here. There is, further, though, the issue of how public policy should address this
matter in the District of Columbia. Should we enact as law, or require the promulgation of law enforcement regulations that provide assurances well beyond
those afforded by the Constitution? I believe we should, and welcome discussion
on this point.
Another allegation included in the Judiciary Committee's current investigation
holds that police actions here in the last three years have been based on the
content of speech. The IMF-World Bank protests and police response in Seattle
in 1999 led to significant property damage and physical harm. Anti-globalization
demonstrations and police response in Genoa, Italy, resulted in the death of a
protester. The demonstrations that have a longer history in the District of Columbia such as the annual anti-abortion marches and one-time events like the Million
Mom March have not produced the kind of police planning and deployment that
has marked the IMF-World Bank meetings here since Seattle. My constituents,
and perhaps even a majority of participants in this symposium, would likely consider it reasonable to put more planning and greater levels of police deployment
into anti-globalization demonstrations than the Million Mom March. But when is
it appropriate-desirable even-and when is it patently unconstitutional to base
law enforcement responses on the message brought forward by demonstrators? I
welcome dialogue on this point.
Turning to a simpler if not an easier question, and another one to which I do
not yet have the answer: is the District's Metropolitan Police Department capable
of policing itself to preclude and prevent violations of civil liberties? It is a matter of public record today that the Metropolitan Police Department's own internal investigation of the September 2002 mass arrests in Pershing Park found that
the Department violated its own general orders. None of the nearly 400 arrests
led to prosecution. In the wake of that event, and that finding, we are attempting
to assess whether there were signals given within the department itself that might
have indicated a problem with those arrests, prior to the concerns raised with the
Committee during a public hearing in October of last year. We are reviewing the
department's standing protocols for planning and deploying for demonstrations,
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as well as the operational plans for each individual protest, looking specifically at
the April 2000 anti-globalization protests, the January 2001 inaugural protests,
and the September 2002 antiwar and anti-globalization protests.
What we are doing in the Committee today is a one-time investigation. But in
asking the question about the department's capacity at self-examination I hope
we can preclude the need for any subsequent, similar investigations. It is my hope
that we can be assured that the Metropolitan Police Department's own institutional structure, rules and processes would either preclude any violation of law or
general order, or, in the event of any excess or violation, generate its own review
and discipline. I anticipate that our conclusions and recommendations will address ways to strengthen the Department's and the District government's, capacity at self-policing in this arena.
Finally, on all of these questions there is an underlying issue of who sets the
balance between security and public safety on the one hand, and individual rights
and personal privacy on the other. The D.C. Council has approved regulations
and is considering legislation to govern the use by police of closed circuit television for surveillance. The federal government deploys a far larger number of surveillance cameras in public space in the District of Columbia, but there has been
no comparable policy review of those cameras and their deployment by the federal government. It may be that the District of Columbia Council Judiciary Committee concludes that there have been excesses and preemptive actions with
regard to demonstrations in the District. And we can and will address those issues. But if those excesses were prompted by federal law enforcement, how do
we go about asserting our own jurisdictional rights?
There clearly is no shortage of key issues to be debated as broadly and as
exhaustively as possible. I welcome this Symposium today, and your comments
on all of these points.

